Tsar Fedor Alekseevich: unknown Russian tsar. Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich: unknown Russian Tsar Agafya Simeonovna Grushevskaya

REFORMER

The first years of the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich resembled a fabulous dream for his relatives - the Miloslavskys. Having taken many high positions at once, they rolled like cheese in butter. The very high position of the royal relatives in the first years of the reign prompted many historians to think about the complete omnipotence of the Miloslavskys and the weakness of the sovereign himself.

There are serious grounds for such a conclusion.

It has already been said above: there is no reason to believe that Fedor Alekseevich was completely removed from the government of the country by his relatives and other aristocratic clans. He could interfere in serious state affairs, and intervened at times. So, probably, Matveev was finally overthrown by his will, and by his will, the “party” of the Naryshkins, competing with the Miloslavskys, was spared from heavy disgrace, loss of life, and distant exile. The young tsar participated in negotiations with foreigners, and it is clear that at least he did not play the role of a “living scenery”.

But with all that, the degree of his intervention in the affairs of government remained low.

This can be seen from a variety of sources.

So, for several months after the death of his father, Fedor Alekseevich could not marry the kingdom and, obviously, generally balanced between life and death. It is impossible to imagine that he could then fully participate in such a complex matter as the development of new laws. Meanwhile, on March 10-14, 1676, a whole code of laws on noble land ownership comes into force. First, 28 (!) "new decree articles" on estates, then another 16 "new decree articles" on estates. Under each article, the words: “The Great Sovereign pointed out, and the boyars were sentenced ...” - and then follows the essence of legalization. The meaning of both codes is to clarify important details in the reasoning of land affairs. They are the fruit of a thorough acquaintance with the Cathedral Code of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, and with his later decrees, and with judicial precedents. Fluently, on the go, this cannot be created.

And this extensive set of government regulations was the result of the legal creativity of a fourteen-year-old, moreover, a very ailing king? That's hardly.

Even earlier, at the end of February, the Russian government decided to allow the Persians to trade in raw silk in Arkhangelsk. The materials of the investigation carried out by the Duma on the transit trade in oriental goods are, again, very extensive. They testify to deep penetration into the topic, deliberation and solidity of the decision made. The sovereign, in principle, could not manage to “raise” such a significant amount of documents after the funeral of his father, moreover, in a state of serious illness.

We have to summarize: while the teenage king was recovering from his illness, the current government issues were resolved as usual. They were dealt with by the Boyar Duma, heads of orders, clerks, who were skilled in the affairs of their administrative specialization. Of course, both codes were prepared a long time ago, even under Alexei Mikhailovich. His successor could only give formal permission: yes, put into action. And it’s not even very clear to what extent his opinion was asked and to what extent he was able to express it ...

And here is another example: under Alexei Mikhailovich, an order of secret affairs arose. According to one Russian defector to the Swedes, this department was deliberately taken out of the control of the Boyar Duma by the tsar: “Order of Secret Affairs; and in it sits a deacon, and clerks with 10 people, and they know and do all sorts of royal, secret and obvious things; and the boyars and duma people do not enter into that Order and do not know the affairs, except for the tsar himself. And according to the Order, clerks with ambassadors are sent to states, and to ambassadorial congresses, and to war with governors, so that ambassadors in their embassies do a lot of things not to honor their sovereign in travel and in colloquial speeches ... and governors in regiments repair a lot of lies over military people, and those clerks over the ambassadors and over the governors spy on the tsar, having arrived, they say ... And that Order is arranged under the current tsar, so that his royal thought and deeds are fulfilled all according to his desire, and the boyars and thoughtful people about it what they didn't know." For Alexei Mikhailovich, the Order of Secret Affairs served both as a personal office and an institution that controlled the activities of other departments and officials, but also as a means to achieve a “breakthrough” in those areas of the economy, politics, and military affairs where it became urgently needed. The palace economy fell under the jurisdiction of the same order. And - concurrently - issues of state security.

The "serving aristocracy" sat in the Boyar Duma. Of course, the withdrawal of such a significant area of ​​state affairs from the Duma's sphere of competence ran counter to the interests of the nobility. So, immediately after the death of Alexei Mikhailovich, the order was disbanded. Instantly. It can be said that the body of the sovereign did not have time to cool down ...

Was this “reform” also made by Fedor Alekseevich? The one that "...didn't have enough strength... to talk loudly"? Moreover, obviously to the detriment of itself? Deliberately burned a priceless department, making a breathtakingly generous gift to the nobility? Looks fantastic. Especially when you consider how the young king behaved later. Having matured and having come into good health, he will establish the "Reprisal Chamber", to which he will transfer part of the functions of the long-vanished order of Secret Affairs.

It is very likely that for some time the most powerful courtiers, the heads of large aristocratic "parties" used Fyodor Alekseevich's inexperience and fragile health. They crushed the order of the Secret Affairs in the name of the young king, they introduced new laws, they redistributed the “portfolios” of key managers among themselves.

Moreover, the Miloslavskys are far from the only and probably not the strongest group of nobles who ruled the country from behind Fyodor Alekseevich.

From those times, memories of a kind of peaceful “sharing of power” between several influential families have survived: “After the death of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the main boyars who had great power in government were ... Prince Yury Alekseevich Dolgoruky ... the butler and gunsmith Bogdan Matveyevich Khitroy. Of course, we are not talking about individuals, but about the heads of influential court "parties". They decided to share “spheres of influence” among themselves and with the Miloslavskys, and therefore they summoned the eldest in the Miloslavsky family, Ivan Bogdanovich, the cousin of Fyodor Alekseevich’s mother, from the Kazan province. Dolgoruky and Khitrovo gave him control of many orders, but they also took care of the guarantees of their own high status. Not wanting to lose their positions at court, they “... the dubious nobleman Ivan Yazykov, a man of great wit, also Alexei Likhachev, who was a teacher of Tsarevich Alexei Alekseevich, a man of good conscience, firmly praising the sovereign, was introduced into mercy. And besides, there were a few Dolgoruky in the room, sharp people, left ... ". Another court "clan" is not mentioned - the princes Odoevsky, but he, apparently, participated in the redistribution of power, since he retained influence and several high positions for his people. Milo-Slavsky, hurrying to Moscow, from the road began to call convenient assistants to his command. But due to inexperience and greed, he made mistakes: "... who were immediately assigned [to him as assistants] ... these were more of his friends than people who knew the business, and others were cunningly presented to him - from people unreliable to him."

The result of the administrative leadership of Miloslavsky was sad. Arriving in Moscow, he immediately took up the affairs of many institutions at once. “But after neither the time nor the opportunity for him to consider all cases, the comrades were not very skillful in the order ... the other comrades and cunning began to prepare the way for complaints against him, through which many complaints soon came to the sovereign. And according to many reminders from the sovereign, there was dissatisfaction, it came that he, not having remained in great respect with the sovereign, was forced to ask that some orders be removed from him. Which is done, but with little honor to him. Later, the onslaught of other court "parties" continued, and Miloslavsky gradually lost ground, retaining not so much all-encompassing administrative power as its appearance. The nobles, more experienced in palace games, lured him into a trap, giving away so much that Miloslavsky could not cope with such a piece, then discredited him and contributed to his relegation to the background.

What does it say?

Firstly, the Miloslavskys were not so strong and omnipotent at the initial stage of their reign. The older men of the clan were too distantly related to the monarch. Ivan Bogdanovich Miloslavsky is his mother's cousin, and Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavsky is the fourth cousin of Tsarina Maria Ilyinichna. Not enough to qualify for a long all-round guardianship over the young king. They tried to take over the reins of the central state apparatus, but ... they did not have enough strength. The Miloslavskys might not have turned out to be so bad, but in addition to their inexperience in intrigues and lust for power, self-interest ruined them. One of the foreign officers who then found themselves in the Russian service left an eloquent testimony: “The uncle of the tsar made a general review. And among the foreigners who commanded the Russian troops, there were many who received their high ranks more by goodwill than by merit. They had to retire. Other colonels were even demoted again to warrant officers. There began great mourning and lamentation. Each sought help from his kind patrons. However, the uncle of the king was noble and powerful, did everything as he pleased. He was rich and inspired the young king with everything he wanted. Only one who had a beautiful wife or daughter could achieve anything. So thanks to a beautiful woman, many again received their ranks. About a year before that, I had been promoted to lieutenant colonel. Since things now turned out so dishonorably, I asked for my resignation, which almost plunged me into an extremely distressed situation: I was threatened with nothing more than a whip and deportation to Siberia.

This shows that, on the one hand, I. B. Miloslavsky had the ability of a efficient administrator. He cleaned the army of ballast, to put it mildly, which did not add to its combat effectiveness. On the other hand, he showed himself to be a bad Christian, and also, using modern concepts, a real corrupt official.

Secondly, very serious positions were maintained by other groups of nobility. Obviously, during the first months of the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich, the Dolgoruky and Khitrovo (and possibly the Odoevskys) could twirl them as they wanted. It was they, apparently, who smashed the order of the Secret Affairs to pieces. Then they skillfully directed the life of the court, outwardly giving primacy to Miloslavsky. But they could, if necessary, achieve their goal, acting through the dummy close associates of the sovereign. It's time to talk not about the period of "the reign of the Miloslavskys", but about the time when the "serving aristocracy" represented by several strongest "parties" had a predominant influence on affairs. The Miloslavskys were just one of them.

One way or another, for several years the teenage king was not a full-fledged ruler. Russia was ruled by a conglomeration of noble families, uniting around them significant forces of the nobility and the Moscow nobility.

This situation changed gradually. You should not think that the conflict with relatives due to his marriage to Agafya Grushetskaya cut the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich, like an ax, in two. As if until 1680 the tsar was a purely decorative figure, and then with a jerk he regained the reins of government ... It seems that a different picture is more plausible.

At the helm of the supreme power, several processes took place at the same time, defining its face. On the one hand, the Miloslavskys, having undergone a short rise, were gradually losing influence. On the other hand, the sovereign grew up and, as they say, gradually "entered into business."

Fedor Alekseevich adapted to the difficult decision-making machine in the Muscovite state, looked for loyal assistants, and determined for himself the priorities of big politics. Of course, in 1676 and 1677 he was still very weak as a real ruler. But later, the real "weight" of the king as a "supreme administrator" begins to grow. Yes, by 1680 he was already able to put forward projects for large-scale reforms and bring them to fruition. But these new possibilities are the result of a gradual accumulation of strength, and not a one-time change. In 1678 and 1679, absolutely independent actions of the young monarch are already visible: he gives the “Upper” printing house for the educational programs of Simeon of Polotsk and resumes the construction of the New Jerusalem Monastery near Moscow. Finally, in the presence of the royal person, a circle of trusted persons is formed. In part, they are recruited from those who are “let down” as advisers by the Dolgoruky, Khitrovo, and Odoevskys. In part, the tsar himself brings efficient nobles closer to him.

In addition to the Likhachevs and Yazykov, Kondyrev and Taras Eliseevich Poskochin are towering - from the environment of horse breeders. Of the well-born aristocrats, Prince Vasily Vasilyevich Golitsyn suddenly turns up near the tsar.

This last one deserves special attention. In terms of nobility, he could compete with the Odoevskys, surpassed the Dolgoruky, certainly towered over the Miloslavsky and Khitrovo. The prince himself stood at the head of a large aristocratic clan. The Golitsyns have long owned vast estates. There is no doubt about their viability. In other words, Vasily Vasilyevich had complete independence in relation to all court "parties". In addition, the prince was marked by a number of traits of a great politician. He had tactical military experience, although he did not achieve outstanding success on the battlefield. He received an excellent education for those times. But something else is more important: God endowed V.V. Golitsyn with great diplomatic talent and the ability to think big. And in terms of palace intrigues, he was no less a specialist than Dolgoruky, Khitrovo, etc. The support provided to the sovereign by such a person is extremely important. It makes us assume that Golitsyn is a person who has a very significant influence on Fyodor Alekseevich. So, and on the main political course.

Judging by the practical steps of Vasily Vasilyevich as a great statesman, he was a "Westernizer" much more than the sovereign himself. The prince was in a hurry where Fyodor Alekseevich was inclined to move without haste. And the position of favorite under Princess Sophia gave Golitsyn the coveted opportunity to "hurry things up."

So, when the inner circle of managers was formed next to Fyodor Alekseevich, the monarch received a “team” capable of carrying out his will for transformations.

That's when the reforms began.

In many ways, they were prompted by the big war for Ukraine. Or rather, that episode of the titanic struggle for Ukraine, which fell on the years of the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich.

In 1654, the Muscovite state and Poland began a large-scale armed confrontation. One way or another, all of Eastern Europe took part in it. Russia sought to recapture the lands she had lost after the Great Troubles, and, if possible, tear off “Lithuanian Rus” from the Commonwealth, as the areas belonging to the Polish kings, but inhabited by Orthodox East Slavic peoples, were called. Its inhabitants called themselves "Russians" and "Russians" called their faith (that's what they wrote then: through one "s").

The war with the Commonwealth lasted 13 years, until 1667. Russia recaptured Smolensk, Velizh, Nevel, Sebezh, Seversk land, received the Dnieper Left Bank, put Kiev under control. The Commonwealth did not have the strength to take away all the acquisitions of Alexei Mikhailovich. But by the time of the accession of Fyodor Alekseevich to the throne, the final peace agreement had not yet been concluded. Diplomats made do with truces, the Poles dreamed of at least partially curtailing Moscow's new possessions. Moreover, Russia kept Kiev with the region, formally having no right to do so. However, there was a reason for this. In addition to the Moscow state and the Commonwealth, serious "players" on the chessboard of the colossal war were the Crimean Khanate, the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Cossack foreman, who hesitated in his addictions to one overlord, then to another. To give Kiev meant to expose its Orthodox population to the terrible danger of a Turkish-Tatar pogrom. The Poles, even in alliance with the Cossacks - a very problematic alliance - did not have enough forces to effectively defend against a large invasion from the south. But they could set the Turks and Tatars against Ukraine. From time to time they did. Our ambassador to the court of the Polish king, V. M. Tyapkin, informed the Russian government about this. The great master of diplomatic games A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin warned the tsar himself about the same.

It is curious that since 1672 the Commonwealth was in alliance with Russia against the Turks. They fought together against the same enemy. With coordination of efforts, the cross could decisively prevail over the crescent in this region. However, the contradictions between the Commonwealth, the Ukrainian Cossack regions and the Moscow state turned out to be too sharp for organizing a general joint offensive. The allies saw each other as almost more dangerous enemies than the Turks. Paradoxical situation!

Ultimately, Russia found itself in the face of an open armed clash with the Turks. With the Crimea, a vassal of the Turkish sultans, they fought for almost 200 years. You could say it's a habit. Against the Crimeans, a large army was deployed annually in the south, fortified lines were built (“security lines”), and new “towns” were erected south and south. Few fought with the Turks. But in Moscow they understood very well: this is an order of magnitude stronger enemy. And the western flank of the Ukrainian theater of operations was in danger from the Poles.

Bad war. Difficult war. A war with an unpredictable ending.

Actually, it was not Fyodor Alekseevich who started it. He just inherited the war that began under his father, Alexei Mikhailovich. In this grand confrontation, the Dnieper Right Bank, as well as all the Cossack regions that turned out to be south and west of it, became the main “bone of contention”. First of all, Chigirin is a strong fortress, historically associated with the emergence of an independent hetman's power.

Little Russia at that time was divided in two. Part of the Cossacks, led by Hetman Ivan Samoylovich, stood under the banner of the Muscovite state. The other part, under the leadership of Hetman Petro Doroshenko, surrendered to the protection of the Turks and Tatars, which turned out to be monstrously ruinous. Beaten, bled white by the Turks, the Commonwealth withdrew from the war.

The confrontation for the Right-Bank Ukraine fell on the Muscovite state as a heavy burden. The situation for the Russian troops developed relatively favorably, but what was it worth! “Russia came to the reign of Fyodor Alekseevich with increased taxes and constant emergency extortions, with limited mobilization resources and regular troops dispersed on a huge front,” writes a modern historian.

In 1676, the Russian commander G.I. Chigirin opened the gates to Kosagov. The key position of the entire Right Bank fell under the control of the sovereign governors! The old, stubborn enemy of Russia, Doroshenko, resigned the hetman's power and surrendered the hetman's artillery park. The former hetman was sent to Moscow.

2,400 archers moved from Moscow to Chigirin. They formed the core of the garrison. Together with them, the Cossacks of Samoilovich and the Russian soldier regiment, accustomed to new, European tactics, were supposed to defend the city. The defenders of the city were led by the Russian colonel Matvei Osipovich Krovkov, as well as a foreigner in the Russian service, Major General Trauernicht. The latter ordered the walls to be repaired, the fortifications to be strengthened, and the defective cannons to be put in order. As a result, the enemy was met by a modern powerful stronghold, reinforced by the fortification art of foreign servants of Fyodor Alekseevich.

The Turks, having gone to Chigirin with the support of the troops of Moldavia, Wallachia, the Crimean Khanate, had, according to various sources, from 65 to 82 thousand fighters with 36 guns. With them were Cossack detachments, subordinate to the puppet pseudo-hetman, a great ill-wisher of Russia, Yuri Khmelnitsky.

This newly-minted "hetman" addressed the defenders of the city with a letter, where he urged them to submit to him as the "legitimate heir" of his father, Bohdan Khmelnitsky. He accompanied his call with promises of generous payments and gifts. But in the city they knew perfectly well what to expect from the Tatars and the Turks. The Cossacks referred to the Russian garrison, and the Russians decided to stand firm.

In early August 1677, an armed struggle for Chigirin began.

The Turks began earthworks, gradually approaching Chigirin. With overwhelming superiority in strength, they acted slowly, for sure. However, they were resisted fiercely, knocking down the offensive impulse. The Turks were struck in great numbers during risky sorties. These sorties required incredible courage, but more than once they brought success to the besieged. Both foreign and Russian sources unanimously narrate about them.

According to Dragoon Colonel Patrick Gordon, one and a half thousand Russian archers and Ukrainian Cossacks, under cover of night, hit the positions of the Turks and killed many, taking them by surprise. The next time the sortie was made in broad daylight: “They set out, armed with berdysh and half-peaks, and so decisively that 24 Turkish banners, leaving trenches and aproshi, fled to their guns. In this sortie, according to the report of the besieged, several hundred Turks were killed, and of the besieged - 26 and about twice as many were wounded.

The same picture can be traced in Russian documents. Aleksey Matveyevich Luzhin, the half-head of the Moscow archers, had every reason to proudly talk about the actions of the Moscow troops near Chigirin in August-September 1677: “Three weeks it was from the city against the enemies of all sorties from 10, and the centurions went to the vylaski, and with them archers and Cossacks hunters. And by the grace of God and the great sovereign with happiness, many were beaten on those vylaskas of the Turks, and in the Upper City, military people from the Turks took three banners from those vylaskas ... And by attack the Turks came to the city for many days with shields without ladders, and the tours were thrown into the ditch and fell asleep earth. And at night, military people from the ditch that earth scattered along the ditch to the sides and in the middle of the ditch those tours, folding, burning. And how they burned those tours, and at that time from the city they fired cannons and small guns at the people of the Turks without ceasing. And the Turkic people and the Volohs, and the Muntians, and the Serbs, were spoken by the taken languages ​​​​and the settlers who moved to the Lower City x by the Cossack, which was beaten in the vylaskas and in the attacks of six thousand or more.

Russian archers and Ukrainian Cossacks acted in full alliance and mutual understanding.

The arrival of the Tatars to help the Turks did not change the situation at all. The Crimean Khan did not burn with the desire to expend his forces, serving the military needs of the overlord. His subjects fought without much enthusiasm. Sometimes they even incited the besieged to resist.

In mid-August, the Turks resorted to a decisive assault. However, they were completely defeated and rolled back with heavy losses. The mine war also did not bring good luck to the Turks.

Meanwhile, the Russian government sent a large army to help the fighting Chigirin. According to the same Gordon, a participant in the campaign, in the second half of July 1677, this army, having concentrated its combat forces, arrived at the theater of operations: “July 27. Several regiments crossed the gati near Sudzha and lodged separately on the other side ... The army is now assembled, and the census of it was sent to Moscow - [total] more than 42,000 people. Boyarin (Prince G. G. Romodanovsky. - D. V.) came out, and we stood in our usual Wagenburg, 10 miles from Sudzha. Having learned back in Sudzha that the Turks had crossed the Dniester, we now received the correct information that they had been waiting for the Tatars for several days, set out when they arrived, and, together with Yuras Khmelnitsky, were heading towards Chigirin ... We set out early and set up camp in the forest near the Alyoshka River , 10 versts from Sumy.

In anticipation of the appearance of Romodanovsky with regiments, the Turks once again rushed to the attack. And they were repulsed again.

The Russian army came close to the enemy positions. Skirmishes with detachments of fresh troops also developed unsuccessfully for the Turks.

At the end of August, reinforcements arrived: a whole army with Prince V.V. Golitsyn and I.V. Buturlin at the head. “There were about 15 or 20 thousand people in this army, among whom were many princes and noble nobles of the imperial court,” Colonel Gordon reports. Frightened by the new forces that came to the aid of Romodanovsky, "... the Turks ... lifted the siege and left in great fear, throwing a lot of grenades and other siege supplies." Their losses reached, according to various estimates, from two to eight thousand killed alone. The besieged, as well as the army of Romodanovsky, suffered losses of just over a thousand people.

By decree of Fyodor Alekseevich, the participants in the Chigirin campaign were generously awarded.

The Russian government did not at all believe that the Turks would give up their plans in Ukraine after the first defeat. They were expected the next year: they strengthened the garrison, restored the old fortifications of Chigirin, and built new ones. All these preparations turned out to be very appropriate when a new Turkish army appeared under the walls of the city.

In the summer of 1678, the second act of the great Chigirin drama was played out.

In the first days of July 1678, Chigirin was defended by about 11-13 thousand cavalry and infantry with 86 guns and mortars. According to the information received from the defectors, and very inaccurate, the Turkish-Moldovan army, which came near Chigirin, numbered 102,000 combat elements alone. On her side were also the forces of the Crimean Khanate and the Cossacks of Yuri Khmelnitsky. Artillery consisted of about 120 guns.

The besieged waged an uninterrupted multi-day battle for the fortifications, suffered colossal losses from the incessant bombardment, beat the enemy on attacks and during sorties. They had it harder and harder: the huge superiority of the Turks in forces, as well as the high fighting qualities of their army, affected. Every day of fighting and skirmishes pulled out from the ranks of the besieged several tens, or even hundreds of soldiers. But the Turks had a hard time. According to the prisoner, they lost “... over 6,000 people and more than twice as wounded; the Turks are amazed at such resistance - they cannot smash or reduce to ashes a pile of firewood!

The first days of August brought a change. Under Chigirin, the Russian army of the same G. G. Romodanovsky appeared: 50 thousand Russian fighters plus another 30 thousand Cossacks of Samoylovich. She dealt several sensitive blows to the enemy. The number of Russian fighters, foreign mercenaries and Ukrainian Cossacks turned out to be comparable to the number of enemy forces. The confrontation resumed with new energy. The Turks tried to attack the dilapidated city with large forces, went on the assault with the bitterness of despair: victory was sailing away from them! - but they couldn't do anything. Chigirin stood unmoved.

Perhaps a little more determination on the part of our governors - and the city could have been defended. However, the garrison defending it was exhausted to the extreme, panic among the soldiers grew, and it no longer made sense to fight for the ruins. The Russian command chose a passive scenario of hostilities. The defenders of Chigirin were recalled, the city and the remains of the fortifications were set on fire, the powder magazines were blown up by explosions. In fact, the Chigirin position was not so much surrendered as destroyed. The enemy, who fought for her with such stubbornness, could not take advantage of her, since he had only ashes at his disposal.

Many then scolded Romodanovsky for indecision, for a strangely slow manner of fighting. But the state of the Russian army, largely staffed by yesterday's peasants, left much to be desired.

Romodanovsky squeezed out of her the maximum combat capability. Many regiments of the new type - soldiers, reiters - showed poor organization. So was it worth risking a pitched battle with the Turks?

In addition, the will of the prince was fettered by orders from Moscow. The Russian government was not going to fight to the death for Chigirin, emptying the treasury and laying out the Ukrainian steppes with a carpet of dead Russian bodies. The Turks were given back to keep them out of areas firmly controlled by Russia, such as Kiev. And in the end they decided to sacrifice Chigirin - for the sake of peace. But to sacrifice so that the Turks would suffer the maximum damage for this acquisition and lose all desire to continue the war. Romodanovsky was given an order: if necessary, "Chigirin ... reduce (that is, destroy. - D.V.)… but to watch and warn firmly, so that that Chigirin information is not disgusting to the inhabitants of Little Russia. The threatening position of the Poles spurred the Moscow government to rush to conclude peace. The “Allies”, seeing the terrible tension of the Russian military machine, began to put forward bold demands, frightening with a new invasion of our territory.

The peals of the Chigirin cannonade reached the ears of Polish diplomats who came to Moscow for negotiations: “On August 1, the twenty-seventh meeting followed ... Meanwhile, good news came about the victory won over the Turks at the city of Chigirin, which they besieged for a whole summer in the number of 200 thousand, and the Muscovites with as many thousands defended him. It was said that the chief governor Romodanovsky, although he took the camp from the Turks and, having taken huge booty, killed them up to 50 thousand, but because he himself lost most of the army, he fell out of favor with the king, who decided to recall him and replace him. However, holding on through the efforts of his friends, he again earned the favor and love of the king by the defeat inflicted on the enemy, which I will now tell about. The fact is that, not really grieving for the loss of the camp, the Turks led the siege of Chigirin more energetically, took the city and betrayed it to complete ruin. The governor entered the castle adjacent to the city and, knowing that he would not hold out for long, ordered secretly to make digs in the ground, pour gunpowder into them and voluntarily surrender the castle to the enemy. The Turks, triumphant, occupied and surrounded him with the whole army; Look, the voivode lit the digs, and thousands of Turks, together with the castle, flew into the air, even more were covered with earth and buried alive without the help of gravediggers.

In the future, the Russian-Ukrainian and Moldovan-Turkish-Tatar armies fought a hard positional struggle, causing serious damage to each other. Exhausted to the limit, the Turks had no choice but to retreat. On the way, they made a devastating raid on Kanev and other towns.

Bottom line: the Chigirin campaign ended without profit, without glory, but the enemy did not gain anything either. Kanev and he had to be returned later.

And this is a good basis for negotiations.

And Chigirin's card played an important role in the diplomatic struggle with the Poles.

In the biographies of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich, they write a lot and tastefully about the events of the Russian-Turkish war. Sometimes they see in it almost the central event of the reign. But if the bloody slaughter with the Turks for Ukraine is really extremely important for the fate of Russia, then for the life of Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich it is in the background. And do not confuse the history of the monarch with the history of his state.

Therefore, the vicissitudes of the great military suffering are presented here very briefly, although in themselves they deserve a separate large book.

Yes, of course, the needs of the war for a long time subordinated themselves to a lot in the domestic and foreign policy of the Muscovite state. The king had to pay close attention to them. But ... firstly, Fedor Alekseevich never went to the front. In general, throughout his life he had not been in the army. The fighting was conducted by his governors. And secondly, with all the strain of diplomatic, economic and mobilization efforts, the young tsar did not participate so much in solving military affairs. B O Most of the war falls on a time when aristocratic "parties" played a central role in governing the country, and Fedor Alekseevich himself had not yet fully taken the reins of government. His involvement with wartime problems was limited to participation in negotiations with the Poles, discussion of a peace treaty with the Turks, reading reports, and even minor private orders.

Perhaps the attention of the sovereign was riveted to the battles and campaigns taking place on the far southern outskirts. But he apparently did not make the main decisions on military issues yet.

From the spring of 1678, the role of the king gradually increased. So, on April 12, a large meeting of the Boyar Duma was held with the tsar at the head and with the participation of the patriarch: a plan of action against the Turks was discussed. The second Chigirinsky massacre found the sovereign at the age of seventeen. He sent his own camp church to the army. Then, in agreement with the patriarch, he ordered to serve requiems for those who died in the battles on August 11-13 in all cathedrals and to enter their names in the synodikons for "eternal commemoration."

In the summer of 1678, when the Polish embassy reached Moscow, Fedor Alekseevich was an active participant in the negotiations.

The sovereign becomes a witness to the cruelest bargaining. The Poles demand to give them Kiev, Smolensk, several small towns, put forward other extensive demands. The calculation is simple: as long as the Russians are bound by the great war with the Turks and Tatars, the threat from the western flank is fatal for them. But news comes from the south: Chigirin fell, but the Turks did not get it; vizier Mustafa, who led the Turkish army, leaves with the troops. The boyars of Fyodor Alekseevich have a hope of turning away the toughest conditions, and the Polish ambassador Czartorysky loses a serious trump card in the game. Now what? The danger of a Polish invasion is extremely unpleasant for Moscow, but this is already a defeated and weakened Poland; Is there a great fear of her?

Patriarch Joachim intervened, calling for concessions: it is terrible to arrange new bloodshed between Christians! Especially at a time when the Basurman threat has not disappeared far. Reluctantly, the boyars, led by the tsar, gave up small towns: Sebezh, Velizh, Nevel and paid 200 thousand rubles in silver. But Kiev, the return of which the Poles so longed for, managed to defend.

The truce with the Commonwealth was extended until 1693. However, seven years before its exhaustion, the two greatest powers of Eastern Europe concluded an "eternal peace" between themselves. Kiev remained with Russia.

Fyodor Alekseevich got a full picture of the fierceness with which negotiations are being conducted on the Ukrainian issue. Little Russia of that time, terribly ruined, actually ruined, became a huge hole where money and troops of three huge states irretrievably flowed: the Turkish Empire, the Commonwealth and Russia. A fish of undoubted benefits in the dark waters of the war for Ukraine was caught only by the Crimean Khanate, which organized raids to replenish the slave markets.

Therefore, for the Russian tsar, the question of an early conclusion of peace was on the agenda.

In 1679 Russian-Turkish-Tatar negotiations began. The king took great interest in them. Still would!

A huge army stood under arms, turning the state treasury inside out. Filed in 1681, the country contained 164 thousand "military people", not counting the hetman's Cossacks; of these, in the south, in the Seversky and Belgorod discharges, the most powerful group was concentrated - 58 thousand fighters! They were waiting for a new invasion of the Turks. The Tatars played pranks, now and then bursting into our lands for the sake of profit. Against them, monstrously expensive new "notch features" were drawn.

The construction of the Insar-Penza line was already in full swing, and in 1679 the construction of the grandiose Izyum line for five thousand kilometers began. It is being built in the most dangerous direction, which has become the southwestern outskirts of the state. New fortifications appear on the outskirts of Kiev. It is difficult to understand how great is the share of the royal participation in this enormous state work. Since the 16th century, Russia has traditionally been fenced off from aggressive neighbors from the south with defensive lines. By the end of the 17th century, this was nothing new. But the very intensity of construction indicates that it was "driven" from above. The Izyum line was created very quickly. So, we can assume: Fedor Alekseevich hurried with this matter, insisted, pressed.

Meanwhile, business with Constantinople-Istanbul was going slowly. They also did not want a new round of large-scale military efforts. The Chigirin massacre had just as devastating an effect on the Sultan's treasury as it did on the Tsar's. But the Turks were in no hurry with the treaty. The Sultan, no less than the Poles, was eager to get Kiev with all the Right-Bank Ukraine. And in Russia, in general, any presence of Turks in Ukraine was considered unreasonable. Tired Little Russia, led by Samoylovich, also wanted peace, but did not seek submission to the Turks. Here the positions of the hetman's leadership and the Russian government coincided.

The place for conducting the negotiation process turned out to be the most unfortunate: Bakhchisaray, the capital of the Crimean Khan. The Tatars were least of all interested in a peace agreement... Hence the acute territorial disputes and tormenting measures against Moscow diplomats.

The result of long squabbles is doubtful. The border of Russian lands was drawn along the Dnieper, but the entire Kiev region remained behind Russia; Zaporozhye did not receive a firm status: the Sultan and Khan did not officially recognize the Zaporozhye region as a royal possession. A kind of “buffer zone” was formed between the territory of the Moscow State and the Turkish-Tatar territory, where Tatar nomad camps were not prohibited. And in general, when transferring Russian conditions, which seemed to have already been discussed in Bakhchisarai, to Turkish letters, a lot of arbitrary, obscure, abbreviated appeared. P. Voznitsyn set out from Moscow to finalize the warped treaty in Constantinople. But he never managed to return the article about Zaporozhye to the treaty.

Fedor Alekseevich himself and the boyar government were dissatisfied. Their reaction did not remain a secret for foreigners: “The ambassador, who returned from the Porte, brought with him a peace treaty, not so much true as false: the boyars, having gathered in the Council, interpret the meaning of the treaty and find nothing in it, except empty and meaningless words. The sovereign was angry at their oversight, at how they allowed the infidels to push their borders into his state to the Don, not even excluding the fortresses of Vasilkov and Kiev ... The Muscovites were frightened, seeing that peace with this enemy was not reliable; and the sovereign of the kingdom of Moscow did not want to agree to this treaty, foreseeing from that the closest disaster for his state ... "

However, the letter approved by the Sultan was nevertheless accepted in Moscow. The devastated, depopulated Zaporozhye was a problem, not a gain. Little Russian people hurriedly left their places and moved to Russian lands, under the protection of the royal regiments. So they decided to donate the Zaporozhye region - just as they had previously sacrificed Chigirin. A lot of things were sacrificed then for the sake of preserving Kiev and for the sake of finding peace ...

The Bakhchisaray peace treaty of 1681 summed up the monstrously difficult war.

It is difficult to say to what extent the decision taken by the Russian government is correct. On the one hand, if Moscow had shown more firmness in the negotiations, had it been ready to continue the war, perhaps the Turks would have conceded. For them, this struggle also did not bring much profit. On the other hand, the continuation of the conflict led to new ruin, new casualties and - most importantly - to the danger of new riots.

By 1681, Fedor Alekseevich became a full-fledged autocrat. None of the leaders of the Russian boyars - neither Golitsyn, nor Dolgoruky, for example, nor even more so Miloslavsky - nor the Boyar Duma as a whole could "drag" the approval of the peace treaty past the tsar. It is absolutely clear: it was Fedor Alekseevich who made the final choice. He agreed to end the war in this way. It should be emphasized that let not the king himself fought, but He was the one who ended the war. This is his will, his policy. The results of the titanic struggle turned out to be rather modest, but not a failure. Russia kept the "titmouse in hand" when they tried to pull it out. We should not forget about another benefit of the Treaty of Bakhchisaray: now the monarch and the government have received a long-awaited chance to reduce internal tensions. Refuse extraordinary extortions, from continuous mobilization efforts. And consequently, to begin the gradual withdrawal of society into a normal state.

Aleksey Mikhailovich fought, fought, fought without end and edge ... He earned a riot, the Salt and Copper riots, colossal uprisings in Pskov and Novgorod the Great, as well as many other rebellious speeches, but military operations did not stop until his death hour.

And his son stopped it. Refused something - yes. But ... silence came in Russia.

War is an excellent mirror for government. It increases the reflection of everything that is unreliable, uncomfortable, fragile. In other words, everything for which you have to pay dearly in extreme conditions. After the war has poked its nose into the most severe shortcomings, it is difficult not to notice them.

Sovereign Fyodor Alekseevich in the final stages of the war is an adult, bound by marriage, surrounded by intelligent assistants, who has gained serious experience in state activity. He clearly saw the shortcomings of the war. And having seen, he began to straighten them.

The monarch saw the terrible bulkiness of the military, and other management. The struggle between military leaders for seniority introduced disruptions to the well-coordinated work of the military mechanism. Infantry regiments, reytar, dragoons, trained and armed in a new way, that is, according to European models, either showed great stamina, or suddenly lost their organizing principle and turned into disorderly crowds. In civil administration, all sorts of big things got stuck on trifles, on “turnover”. The work of different departments did not have a common coordination. The ranks and positions, sometimes merging into a single whole, sometimes differing, were more in line with the old tribal way of Russian society than with the new, “regular” state order.

Much needed to be changed. In addition, there were means and opportunities. And most importantly - the will. The monarch's will to large-scale transformations.

First of all, Fedor Alekseevich simplified the regional administration. In addition to the governors in the cities, there were various officials - elected and non-elected, who had power on private issues. These are, first of all, the “labor elders”, “detectives”, “pit clerks”, “heads” at grain warehouses and all kinds of “kissers”. They did not obey the governors and conducted their affairs independently. Sometimes the work of different branches of the administration was duplicated, creating confusion, introducing unnecessary expenses to local residents. The year 1679 put an end to this variegation: all power passed to the governors; "labial elders" and other "detectives" with "heads" disappeared.

Soon, Fedor Alekseevich abolished a number of corporal punishments that implied mutilation - for example, cutting off hands, feet, fingers. Instead, violators of the relevant articles of the law began to be exiled to Siberia.

In this transformation, many see evidence of the humanity and mercy of Fyodor Alekseevich. Well, perhaps. However, the royal innovation could have had a completely different reason. Thousands of cripples, wounded in the war, roamed the country. And to add to their number new ones, crippled by the executioner's ax, came out very expensive. After all, in this way the number of full-fledged workers decreased! Treasury interests were violated... In addition, mutilation as a way of punishment for Russian political culture was an "import", and therefore looked like an alien additive. In our country, at least until the middle of the 16th century, criminals were mutilated only as an exception. The Code of Laws of Ivan the Great and Ivan the Terrible did not know "cutting off" as a way to punish the guilty. So it turned out to be an easy thing to cancel something that did not have strong roots in popular soil ...

Humanity in the character of the monarch is visible, rather, according to the orders of 1680 concerning prison inmates. The tsar commanded not to keep "kolodniks" in command huts and prisons for "many days", but to resolve their cases immediately. In addition, they were relieved of the "vlazny" - requisition from the jailers.

In the summer of 1681, in an effort to compensate for the losses of the treasury after the end of a difficult war, Fyodor Alekseevich ordered with all severity to collect duties from all sorts of illegal "bargains". The tsar ordered to abolish the repayment, as a way of collecting duties at customs and in taverns: they gave rise to so many abuses that they were ultimately unprofitable for the treasury. Here you can see an important feature of the royal character: Fedor Alekseevich wanted "transparency" in financial matters and complete rationality in everything. He wanted to achieve a correct, “regular” and most efficient work order from the state machine. He loved the "system".

Therefore, one more financial reform of his time is not surprising. The government has completely switched to the "household" form of taxation. The townspeople and a huge number of "bobs" - peasants who did not have a full-fledged arable economy - paid from the "yards", their ability to bear the sovereign's "tax" was judged by property and "industries". Those who did not have their own land, such as rural artisans, various dependent people at monasteries, bishops' houses, courts of the nobility, also took on part of the "tax". Instead of numerous various fees, the government introduced a single common tax - "streltsy money".

Chapter VII The governor-reformer Sobyanin's managerial "trick" is a developed skill of program-target planning, which at one time allowed the Tyumen region to "sparkle with scales" at the federal level: the governor of the region implemented the most