Military Affairs - Willy Lehmann (German: Willy Lehmann)

Willie Lehman(German: Willy Lehmann; operational pseudonym Breitenbach; March 15, 1884, near Leipzig, German Empire - December 1942, Berlin, Germany) - Gestapo officer, SS Hauptsturmführer and criminal inspector. A secret agent of Soviet intelligence, who became one of the most valuable during almost thirteen years of cooperation with her.

Biography

Born into the family of a school teacher. He studied to be a carpenter, and at the age of 17 he volunteered for the navy, where he served for 12 years. From aboard a German ship he observed the battle of the Russian cruiser Varyag and Japanese ships in the battle of Chemulpo on January 27, 1904.

In 1911, he was demobilized and came to Berlin, where he soon met his old friend Ernst Kuhr, who by that time worked in the Berlin police presidium. Under his patronage, Leman was hired to work in the department for combating org. crime (criminal police), later moved to the political police (which later became the Gestapo), and two years later (in 1913) he was hired by the anti-espionage police department, which he later headed. He was never a member of the Abwehr, since it was exclusively a military and not a police structure.

After the Plenipotentiary Representative Office of the RSFSR was opened in Berlin in May 1918, its employees began to be monitored by Lehmann's counterintelligence department. After the coup of November 4, 1918, Willy Lehmann became chairman of the general meeting of Berlin police officials.

In 1920, the authorities of the Weimar Republic recreated the secret political police, to which Lehmann and Kur returned. Lehman was due to recertify for promotion, but due to a bout of diabetes, the exam was postponed. In the meantime, he was appointed acting head of the office of the department that was engaged in surveillance of foreign diplomatic missions, that is, in fact, he headed the counterintelligence department of the Berlin Police Presidium. In 1927, an experienced intelligence officer was appointed to the position of chief, and Lehman's chances for further promotion dropped significantly. He chose a place to work in the department's file cabinet, which concentrated all the information on employees of foreign embassies.

Recruitment (1929)

During his years of service, Leman became disillusioned with the policies of the existing authorities in the country. He decided to offer his services to Soviet foreign intelligence. In March 1929, at his suggestion, the Soviet embassy was visited by Ernst Kuhr, who by that time was unemployed. After a conversation with him, OGPU officers in Soviet intelligence came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to recruit Kur on a material basis. Agent A-70 was planned to be used to collect information about persons of interest to Soviet intelligence, for which he was entitled to a monthly remuneration depending on the quality of the information provided.

However, to complete the task of the USSR, Kur had to turn to Lehman, who was not very happy with this state of affairs. In addition, Kur spent the money received from Soviet intelligence unwisely, spending it at noisy parties in Berlin restaurants. Fearing that this would attract the attention of the Berlin police, and then lead to him, Lehmann decided to establish direct contact with the Soviet station.

According to one version, Leman agreed to cooperate with the USSR because he was a staunch anti-fascist, according to another - for money. Without exception, all German-language sources (both before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall) adhere to a less romantic version of Lehmann’s collaboration solely for selfish reasons. This is indirectly confirmed by the fact that in the GDR the name Lehmann was not used at all, and was almost forgotten, while the names of other German resistance fighters and spies with immeasurably less merit were named on the streets and used in every possible way for propaganda purposes.

Wilhelm Lehmann is a man who opposed the entire German counterintelligence for 12 years.
Photo courtesy of the author

In mid-June 1945, when the ruins of Berlin were still smoking, a handsome young man called Margaret Lehmann in her modest apartment. Hearing the bell, she opened the door. The stranger, who introduced himself as Alexander Erdberg, asked if he could talk to his friend Willie, whom he had met before the war, but then went their separate ways. In response, Margaret burst into tears. Having coped with her excitement, she said that her husband died in December 1942. All that was left of him was an urn with ashes and personal belongings. She does not know any details of her husband’s death.

The visitor, who spoke German with a pleasant Austrian accent, was the Soviet foreign intelligence resident in Germany, Alexander Korotkov, who worked in Berlin in the early 1940s. Immediately after the end of the war, on behalf of the leadership, he took energetic measures to establish the fate of valuable and reliable NKVD agents, contact with whom was lost during the hard times of war. One of these sources was Breitenbach, who had been an employee of this institution since the creation of the German secret state police (Gestapo) in April 1933. His real name was Wilhelm Lehmann.

KAISER POLICEMAN

In 1884, a son was born into the family of a modest schoolteacher Gustav Lehmann, who lived in the suburbs of Leipzig, who was named Wilhelm at baptism in honor of the heir to the throne, the future Emperor of Germany, Wilhelm II.

Willie's father, like thousands of his other brothers in the profession, was a poor man and could not give his son a proper education. After graduating from school, Willie began studying to become a carpenter. When the young man turned 17, he volunteered for the German Navy, where he served for a total of 12 years. On board a warship of the German squadron in May 1905, he had the opportunity to observe a Russian-Japanese naval battle off the island of Tsushima, in which Russian sailors showed courage and heroism in the fight against superior enemy forces. The courage of the Russian sailors made an indelible impression on Willie. Since then, he has developed deep respect for Russia and Russians in general.

After being demobilized from the army in 1913, Willy came to Berlin. He settled in a cheap boarding house and began attending meetings of the “Union of Africans,” which included participants in Germany’s colonial wars on the African continent. The cruiser Stein, on which Lehmann served, supported the operations of German ground forces in Africa. At one of these meetings, Willy met his old friend Ernst Kuhr, who by that time worked in the Berlin secret political police. Under his patronage, Lehman was hired as a patrol policeman in 1913. A year later, he was enrolled in the counterintelligence department (Abwehr) of the police presidium of the city of Berlin to the position of assistant chief of the office. Since Lehman was an employee of the secret political police, he was not drafted into the active army.

In May 1918, the Plenipotentiary Representative Office of the RSFSR was opened in Berlin, whose employees were monitored by Lehmann's counterintelligence department. The October Revolution of 1917 enjoyed sympathy in Germany, so the employees of this department did not show much zeal in spying on the “Red diplomats”.

On November 4, 1918, a revolution broke out in Germany, dethroning Kaiser Wilhelm II. It began with a revolt of sailors in Kiel. The Berlin police were overcome by the euphoria of freedom. A Committee of Police Officials was spontaneously formed, the chairman of the general meeting of which, as a former naval sailor, was Willy Lehman. He was entrusted with the affairs of the German fleet. During this period, he became friends with the chairman of the Council of Soldiers' and Sailors' Deputies, Otto Streubel, with whom they once served on the same ship.

In April 1920, German authorities re-established the secret political police, and Lehmann and Kuhr returned to their counterintelligence department. For further career advancement, Leman needed to pass the “rank exam,” and he, along with other department employees, began to intensively prepare for it. However, an acute attack of diabetes left Willie bedridden and the exam was postponed. Paying tribute to Leman's experience and organizational abilities, the leadership of the police presidium appointed him acting head of the office of the department that was engaged in surveillance of foreign diplomatic missions. Here, all correspondence regarding the intelligence activities of foreign missions passed through Lehman’s hands. Essentially, he headed the counterintelligence department of the Berlin Police Presidium.

In 1927, Wilhelm Abdt, an experienced military intelligence officer who spoke Russian and Polish, was appointed head of the department. Willy Lehmann realized that he had no chance of getting a promotion, so he chose a quiet place to work in the department’s file cabinet, which concentrated all the information on employees of foreign embassies who, for one reason or another, came to the attention of the Berlin police presidium.

OPERATING NAME BREATENBACH

During his years of working in Germany's secret political police, Willy Lehmann became disillusioned with the policies of the country's ruling elite. He carefully studied the materials available in it about Soviet representatives in Germany and came to the conclusion that in its pure form they were not engaged in any subversive activities against his country. And Leman decided to offer his services to Soviet foreign intelligence.

It should be noted that Willy Lehman did not immediately decide to take this step. Initially, in March 1929, at his suggestion, the Soviet embassy was visited by Ernst Kuhr, who by that time was unemployed, but had not lost some connections in the Berlin police. After a conversation with Kur, one of the employees of the INO OGPU residency, the Center came to the conclusion that it was advisable to recruit him on a financial basis. The newly minted agent was assigned operational code A-70. It was planned to use it to collect information about persons who came to the attention of Soviet intelligence. Monthly A-70 was paid a monetary reward depending on the quality of the information.

However, in order to find answers to his supervisor’s questions about persons of interest to Soviet intelligence, Kur increasingly began to resort to the services of Lehman, who became increasingly burdened by this state of affairs. In addition, having received a reward from his Soviet friends, Ernst loved to throw parties in a restaurant, waste money, and treat everyone. Such places were full of police informants who might be interested in where the unemployed man got so much money and set up surveillance on him. This would inevitably lead the Berlin criminal police to Willy himself, and he decided to independently establish contact with Soviet representatives. In turn, Kur’s contact with Lehman was also of great interest to the INO residency

OGPU in Berlin. The center decided to contact Leman directly and find out the possibility of involving him in working with Soviet intelligence.

The Berlin station assigned Willy Lehmann the operational index A-201 and began its active development.

On September 7, 1929, the head of Soviet foreign intelligence, Meer Abramovich Trilisser, sent an encrypted telegram to the Berlin station, in which, in particular, he indicated:

“We are very interested in your new source A-201. Our only concern is that you have climbed into one of the most dangerous places, where the slightest carelessness on the part of A-201 or A-70 can lead to numerous troubles. We consider it necessary to work out the issue of special conditions for communication with A-201.”

These recommendations of the Center were accepted for immediate implementation by the Berlin station. Willy Lehmann, who received the operational pseudonym Breitenbach, was transferred to the illegal station, headed by illegal intelligence officer Erich Tacke.

IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INFORMATION

Since 1930, Lehmann-Breitenbach's tasks in working in the counterintelligence unit of the Berlin Police Presidium included developing the personnel of the USSR Plenipotentiary Mission and combating Soviet economic intelligence in the country. The information received from the agent allowed the station of the INO OGPU to be aware of the plans of German counterintelligence and take measures to prevent failures of the operatives and the sources in their contacts.

In order to improve the quality of secrecy in working with Breitenbach, at the beginning of 1931, the Center decided to involve another illegal intelligence officer, Karl Silly, who had extensive experience in underground work, in leading the agent. Considering the importance of the source and the information received from it, in the future it was planned to transfer it to the experienced illegal intelligence officer Vasily Zarubin, who was working in France at that time and was supposed to specially move to Germany. To eliminate the possibility of the source's failure, a decision is made to take Ernst Kur away from him and use the agent himself. Later, when Breitenbach “began to work for the Gestapo, his friend was transferred to Sweden, where, with funds from Soviet intelligence, he maintained a small store that served the European OGPU stations as a “mailbox.”

The situation in Germany became more complicated. The Nazis were openly striving for power. Breitenbach knew many prominent bosses of the Nazi Party, including the leader of its assault troops, Ernst Rehm. After Hitler came to power in February 1933, Breitenbach, on the recommendation of Hermann Goering, then Prime Minister of the Prussian government, was transferred to work in the Gestapo. In May 1934 he joined the SS. On June 30 of the same year, as Goering's confidant, Breitenbach took part in Operation Night of the Long Knives to eliminate Ernst Roehm and other stormtrooper leaders.

In 1935, on Goering’s initiative, the Gestapo began purges of “unreliable elements.” Lehmann also came under suspicion, having been reminded of his connection with Otto Streubel. However, the intelligence officer, thanks to his good performance characteristics, managed to retain his post. (In addition, by that time Streubel had converted to Nazi positions and was Goebbels’ deputy in the Ministry of Propaganda.)

Old cadres of the political police were leaving the Gestapo. The Nazis believed that they were all infected with the “spirit of liberalism” of the Weimar Republic. Breitenbach, according to the Nazis, also belonged to the “old guard”. However, he was left in the Gestapo, since he did not hold leading positions in the criminal police, and for many years he worked against Soviet institutions in Germany, which the leadership equated with the fight against communism. In addition, his colleagues respected him for his experience and calm disposition.

As a result of the purges of the Prussian police authorities, the entire secret police of the country, including the Gestapo, was brought under the control of Himmler. The political police departments in the German states, including the secret political police of Prussia, were merged into a single secret police of the Third Reich, the head of which was Reinhard Heydrich, who was also the head of the Security Service (SD) of the Nazi Party. He took with him to Berlin about 40 of the most qualified criminologists from Munich.

On Heydrich’s initiative, the leading department in the Gestapo became the second department, which was engaged in the fight against the “internal enemies” of the Reich, which he himself headed. Breitenbach worked in the third, counterintelligence, department.

In December 1933, Breitenbach was handed over to Vasily Zarubin, who specially arrived in Germany on an American passport for this purpose as a representative of one of the American film companies. Zarubin established permanent contact with Breitenbach in July 1934. Detailed information was received from the agent about the structure and personnel of the IV Directorate of the RSHA (Reich Security Office), its operations, the activities of the Gestapo and Abwehr (military intelligence), military construction in Germany, Hitler’s plans and intentions in relation to neighboring countries. Such information was of particular interest at that time.

A new important stage in working with Lehmann was his move to the Gestapo department, which oversaw issues of counterintelligence support for the defense industry and military development in Germany. This coincided with the creation and first tests of rockets by the German scientist Wernher von Braun, which took place in 1934 near Berlin. It was thanks to Lehmann-Breitenbach that Moscow learned about the launches of the Max and Moritz rockets, on the basis of which the V-1 and V-2 long-range rockets were later created.

At the end of 1935, Breitenbach was personally present at the testing of the first German liquid-fuel rocket, the V-1, at the Peenemünde test site. By the way, already in 1940, missiles of this class were used to bomb British territory. Breitenbach compiled a detailed report on the missile tests and transmitted its description to the station. Based on this information, Soviet foreign intelligence prepared an analysis of the state of rocket science in Germany on December 17, 1935 for a report to Stalin and People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov.

In addition to issues related to rocket science, information received from Breitenbach during this period concerned, in particular, the Nazi programs for the construction of submarines and armored vehicles, as well as data on the production of new gas masks and the production of synthetic gasoline.

Of course, the illegal Zarubin had other sources of information. However, Willie Lehman remained the most important link in his illegal network. Over the course of 12 long years of active cooperation with Soviet intelligence, he, risking his life, reported to the Moscow Center extremely valuable information about the development and strengthening of the fascist regime, about its large-scale preparations for establishing world domination, about the active build-up of military potential and the latest technical developments. Important information about the structure of the German intelligence services, their personnel composition, and methods of work also became available to Soviet intelligence.

Breitenbach was the “shield” of Soviet intelligence in Germany. He promptly warned Soviet intelligence about all Gestapo actions, possible arrests and provocations against Soviet representatives, “legal” and illegal intelligence officers, which during all this time did not know failure. He regularly informed Zarubin about all changes in the operational situation in the country, planned political actions, and behind-the-scenes struggles among the Nazi elite.

It should be emphasized that Breitenbach not only warned Soviet intelligence about the planned provocations of the Gestapo. Using his capabilities in this institution, he sought to attract the attention of the station to the activities of the Polish intelligence services in Germany. In 1934, the Gestapo arrested a prominent Polish intelligence officer, Jurek von Sosnowski, who was engaged in active recruitment work in the most important departments of the Third Reich. So, Sosnovsky managed to recruit a cipher clerk from the General Staff, as well as a typist from the personal office of Alfred Rosenberg, the ideologist of Nazism and the future Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories. He also had “his own people” in the Main Directorate of Imperial Security. Later, while on a business trip in Moscow, Sosnovsky was recruited by Soviet intelligence.

It should be noted that security issues in working with Breitenbach were constantly in the center of attention of both the station and Moscow. At Zarubin’s request, the Center produced a passport for the source in someone else’s name, into which his photograph was pasted. In case of danger with the agent, a detailed plan for his travel outside Germany was worked out. At the same time, conditional signals were introduced to notify the station in case the Gestapo prepared a surprise raid on the Soviet embassy or planned to arrest one of its employees.

The center also demanded that the illegal station exercise maximum caution when organizing communications with the source. This was caused both by the general aggravation of the situation in the country in connection with Hitler’s occupation of the Rhineland, and by the deterioration of the health of Breitenbach himself, who suffered from acute renal colic due to diabetes. Sometimes attacks of illness even led to loss of consciousness. The Center responded to Zarubin’s message about Breitenbach’s serious illness with an urgent coded telegram. It emphasized that if treatment requires large financial expenses, it is necessary to help the source financially, having previously worked out with him the legend of receiving money. Breitenbach's well-known passion for running helped. Once at the hippodrome, after another race, Breitenbach announced to his entourage about a rather large win. At the same time, in a conversation with his friends, he emphasized that he could now afford to see an expensive doctor. Further development of the disease was prevented, and Breitenbach’s relationship with the intelligence officer became even more trusting. However, new challenges awaited Breitenbach.

In 1936, our source was summoned for questioning by the Gestapo and they began to inquire about his connections in the Soviet trade mission. Breitenbach replied that, due to the nature of his service, he deals only with the affairs of the Soviet embassy, ​​has no relation to the trade mission and does not know anyone in it. During further proceedings, it turned out that it was about the agent’s namesake, who was slandered out of jealousy by his mistress. She was arrested by the Gestapo. All suspicions against Breitenbach disappeared after her intensive interrogation.

Communicating with leading Gestapo employees, Breitenbach was able to compile and transmit to Zarubin detailed characteristics of Heinrich Müller, Walter Schellenberg, Heinrich Himmler, Reinhard Heydrich and other leaders of the German intelligence services. And the trust in the agent on the part of the Nazi leadership is evidenced, for example, by the following fact: on the occasion of New Year 1937, Lehmann received, in a ceremonial ceremony, among the four best Gestapo employees, a portrait of Adolf Hitler with his autograph in a silver frame.

In the summer of 1936, the Gestapo leadership also entrusted Breitenbach with counterintelligence support for a number of additional areas of the country's military industry. The source began to receive important information concerning the development of the German military industry: about the laying of more than seven dozen submarines of various classes at its shipyards at once and about the creation of a secret plant for the production of chemical warfare agents. The agent gave Zarubin a copy of the secret instructions, which listed 14 types of the latest weapons that were in the manufacturing or design stage. He also obtained a copy of the secret report “On the Organization of the National Defense of Germany.” All these materials allowed the Soviet leadership to objectively assess the striking power of the Wehrmacht.

ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION

In 1937, Zarubin's collaboration with Breitenbach ended. In the USSR, repressions against security officers began. By order of People's Commissar of State Security Yezhov, the detective was recalled to Moscow. Before leaving, Zarubin instructed the agent to maintain contact with the Center. Fortunately, the operative escaped repression and subsequently worked successfully in the United States and in the Center, becoming a general. But he never returned to Berlin.

An orgy of repression against career intelligence officers virtually paralyzed all Soviet intelligence activities in the late 1930s. This was also reflected in the work with Breitenbach. By that time, the only employee left in the Berlin “legal” station was Alexander Agayants, who, despite the enormous workload, began meeting with the source. Left without an experienced curator, Breitenbach acted at his own peril and risk, obtaining information that, in his opinion, could be of interest to Soviet intelligence. In one of the letters to the Center, the agent wrote: “I have no reason to worry. I am sure that friends know that everything here is done in good faith, everything that can be done. For now, there is no particular urgency in coming to me. If necessary, I will let you know."

Gradually, however, Breitenbach's enthusiasm began to fade. Hitler was preparing the Anschluss of Austria, and the “Munich Agreement” to dismember Czechoslovakia was next. Breitenbach had top secret, proactive information on this matter, which, undoubtedly, could be of primary interest to the Soviet leadership. Nevertheless, during such a dramatic period in history, he was left with virtually no connection with Soviet intelligence. By that time, he collaborated with her for ideological reasons. The material side of the matter interested him little, since his wife Margaret inherited a hotel that brought in a good income. Of course, he did not refuse material rewards, because, like any German, he believed that all work should be paid. But this was not the main thing in his cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Working in the Gestapo and having access to the highest secrets of the Reich, Breitenbach saw where Hitler’s leadership, which was preparing a new world war, could lead the German people.

At the end of November 1938, the last meeting of Agayants with Breitenbach took place. In early December, the operator was hospitalized and soon died in the hospital during surgery.

Breitenbach was left without contact with the Center. Concerned about this state of affairs, in June 1940 he dropped a letter addressed to “the military attaché or his deputy” into the mailbox of the Soviet embassy. In the letter, the agent offered to immediately restore operational contact with him. “If this does not happen,” he wrote, “then my work in the Gestapo will lose all meaning.” However, the pause lasted until September, when Alexander Korotkov, who had arrived in Berlin shortly before as deputy resident of the NKVD, met with the source.

On September 9, 1940, the station received an order personally from People's Commissar Beria, which emphasized: “No special assignments should be given to Breitenbach. It is necessary to take for now everything that is within his immediate capabilities, and, in addition, everything that he will know about the work of various intelligence services against the USSR, in the form of documents and personal reports from the source.” The immediate supervisor of the source was a young station employee, Boris Zhuravlev, who had recently arrived in Berlin after graduating from the Special Purpose School, which trained personnel for intelligence.

Having received materials from the source, he photographed them and returned them the next morning, before the agent went to work. A large amount of material began to arrive from Breitenbach, indicating that Germany was preparing for war against the Soviet Union. So, in March 1941, he reported that the Abwehr had urgently expanded the unit involved in conducting intelligence work against the USSR. It was called "General Command III - Berlin". The head of this unit personally selected candidates for open vacancies.

At a meeting on May 28, the agent informed Zhuravlev that he was ordered to urgently draw up a schedule for round-the-clock duty of employees of his unit. And on June 19, calling the operative to an emergency meeting, Breitenbach reported that the Gestapo had received the text of Hitler’s secret order to German troops stationed along the Soviet border. It ordered military operations against the USSR to begin after 3 a.m. on June 22.

On the morning of June 22, 1941, the building of the Soviet embassy on Unter den Linden in the center of Berlin was blocked by Gestapo officers. Contact with Willy Lehman was lost forever.

TRAGIC ENDING

At the end of the war, Alexander Korotkov was appointed resident of the NKVD in Germany. The employees of his station were given the task by the intelligence leadership to find out the fate of its pre-war sources, including active participants in the anti-fascist organization “Red Chapel”, who died heroically at the hands of Hitler’s executioners.

While sorting through documents in the ruins of the Gestapo headquarters at Prinz Albrechtstrasse 8, one of the employees discovered a burnt registration card for Wilhelm Lehmann, on which a note was made that he had been arrested by the Gestapo in December 1942. The reasons for the arrest were not stated. This registration card, along with other captured documents, was sent to the Center. Moscow quickly established that the executed Gestapo officer was NKVD agent Breitenbach.

Subsequently, Soviet foreign intelligence managed to reconstruct the picture of the death of one of its most valuable sources. Here is how it was.

In May 1942, to restore contact with Breitenbach and continue working with him, Soviet intelligence agent Beck (German communist Robert Barth, who voluntarily surrendered into Soviet captivity) was sent to Berlin. Soon the Gestapo picked up Beck's trail and arrested him. During interrogations under torture, Beck revealed to the Gestapo the conditions for appearing with Breitenbach and the identifying information he knew about him. The Gestapo reported to their boss Heinrich Müller about the betrayal in their own home. On Christmas Eve 1942, Breitenbach was urgently called to duty, from which he never returned.

The Gestapo carried out his arrest and liquidation secretly in order to avoid a public scandal: Himmler and Müller did not dare to report to Hitler that a Soviet agent had been working in the Gestapo for many years. The Gestapo official newsletter included a notice that “criminal inspector Willy Lehmann gave his life for the Fuhrer and the Reich in December 1942.” This is how one of the best agents of Soviet intelligence died tragically, who for many years selflessly, at great risk to his life, honestly informed us about the war being prepared by the Nazis against our country.

Willy Lehman was not a communist, but he sympathized with Russia and its people. His life, his contribution to the common Victory over fascism deserve recognition and grateful memory.

Chapter 14. Willie Lehman

There are many versions about who was the prototype of the much-loved image of the cold-blooded philosopher Stirlitz from the TV series “Seventeen Moments of Spring”. Among the likely candidates are R. Sorge, A. Gurevich, and Y. Blumkin. It must be said that at least the first 2 really fit the artistic image, while all 3 were talented intelligence officers with outstanding character traits. Actually, this is where the similarity ends, because they practically did not work in Germany, much less penetrate into its government structures.

The most interesting thing is that the one who most closely matches the image of Stirlitz is the one who cannot possibly be his prototype, since at the time of the writing of Yu. Semenov’s book and for a long time after its publication, all information about Willy Lehman (pseudonym - Breitenbach) was classified. In addition, by origin he was a purebred German and a petty bourgeois, was not keen on communism, at one time he served as a policeman, worked in the Gestapo and was not listed in political intelligence, despite the fact that for some time his boss, like Stirlitz’s, was V. Schellenberg.

In addition, the events described in the book took place more than 2 years after Willie's death. Of course, all these details contradict the artistic image, but they are not so significant. The writer could embellish them, change them, or elaborate them, taking into account various factors. However, the fact that he could not know about V. Leman completely excludes the use of him as a prototype. However, other intelligence officers are even less suitable for the role of Stirlitz. Most likely, Semenov created a collective image and simply foresaw the possibility of the presence of such a Soviet agent as Breitenbach.

Wilhelm Lehmann was born on May 30, 1884 near Leipzig. His father's modest financial situation did not allow him to receive a good education, and after graduating from school he went to study to become a carpenter. In 1897, the young man volunteered for the German Navy.

In May 1905, he had the opportunity to witness the Tsushima Russian-Japanese naval battle. He admired the courage and heroism of the Russian sailors, who desperately fought against superior enemy forces, and developed deep respect for them.

After serving in the navy, the future Soviet agent arrived in Berlin, where he met his comrade from the secret political police, who helped Willy get a job, first with the police and then with the Abwehr.

In the spring of 1918, a plenipotentiary representative of the young Soviet state appeared in the German capital, and the department in which Neman served was assigned to keep an eye on suspicious Russians. However, the Germans assessed the October Revolution in Russia positively, and therefore no one particularly followed the diplomats of their eastern neighbor.

Not everything was calm in Germany either. At the end of 1918, a revolution occurred, as a result of which Kaiser Wilhelm II had to leave. The metropolitan police succumbed to the general mood of freedom; a Committee of Police Officials was formed, headed by Lehmann, who oversaw the affairs of the German fleet. In the spring of 1920, the secret political police were revived, and Willie resumed his previous work in his unit.

Soon, the police authorities appointed him acting head of the department office, whose area of ​​responsibility included direct surveillance of foreign diplomatic missions. Thus, Lehman coordinated the activities of the entire counterintelligence department of the police.

In 1927, when a real boss was appointed instead of an acting one, Willie realized that he would not be promoted and preferred quiet work in the filing cabinet, where he had the opportunity to obtain information about foreign diplomats who were interested in the secret police.

At this time, disappointment in the policies of the German authorities was brewing inside the humble worker. Having carefully studied the profiles of Soviet representatives, he considered that, in general, they were not carrying out any subversive activities. Then Willie began to think about getting in touch with them. Of course, he did not immediately make such a bold decision with far-reaching consequences. However, he was pushed by the fact that back in the spring of 1929, Ernest Kur, who helped Lehman get a job, was recruited by Soviet intelligence on a monetary basis with the provision of the operational index A-70. He was supposed to provide information on persons of interest to Soviet intelligence. Being already unemployed by that time, Ernest often turned to Lehman for help, but the latter did not particularly like this situation.

In addition, Kur, having received a certain amount from Soviet intelligence, had fun in restaurants, squandered money and, naturally, attracted the attention of informants, of whom there are always many in such establishments. The police might have questions about the sudden improvement in the carouser's financial situation. He would have been followed, and the leads would inevitably lead to the informant in the file cabinet. Therefore, Willie himself made contact with Soviet representatives. However, if he had not done this, they would have approached him anyway, since Lehman had already come to the attention of the “red” recruiters.

The potential agent received the operational index A-201, and Soviet intelligence began to consider the possibilities and advantages of involving him. On September 7, 1929, the head of Soviet foreign intelligence, M. A. Trilisser, notified the Berlin station: “We are very interested in your new source A-201. Our only concern is that you have climbed into one of the most dangerous places, where the slightest carelessness on the part of A-201 or A-70 can lead to numerous troubles. We consider it necessary to work out the issue of special conditions for communication with A-201.” The recruit was immediately given the code name Breitenbach, and contact with him was maintained through the chief illegal intelligence officer E. Takke.

Beginning in 1930, the German leadership entrusted Willy with overseeing the personnel of the plenipotentiary mission of the USSR and countering Soviet economic intelligence in Germany. Information flowed to Soviet intelligence, which made it possible to calculate the steps of German counterintelligence and take the necessary measures to prevent failures of Soviet agents and sources. Since extreme caution was required when working with Willie, an experienced, highly qualified intelligence officer was needed - illegal immigrant V. Zarubin was transferred from France to Germany.

For safety reasons, they decided to use Willie separately from his unemployed acquaintance. The latter later became the owner of a shop in Sweden, which also served as a kind of mailbox for Soviet stations in Europe.

Great Britain and the USA had their informants in the ministries and banking circles of Germany. However, foreign intelligence services did not have an agent located in the thick of events, through whom most of the most important information passed.

Meanwhile, the situation in Germany was developing according to the worst scenario. The Nazis were unsuccessfully striving for power. Breitenbach knew some prominent Nazi figures personally, for example the leader of the assault troops E. Rehm. When Hitler took over the country in February 1933, Willy, through the Prime Minister of Prussia G. Goering, got a job in the Gestapo, and in the spring of 1934 he became a member of the security detachments (SS). In the summer of 1934, he took part in the liquidation of stormtrooper leaders.

In 1935, at the instigation of Goering, the secret police were overwhelmed by a wave of purges of “unreliable elements.” At some point, Willie was almost branded with this “title,” but his good performance characteristics averted suspicion.

Although the policy of the Gestapo leadership required clearing the ranks of old servants of the political police, who were considered bearers of the “spirit of liberalism,” Lehmann managed to remain in his position, since as a policeman he served in lower positions, fought against communism (monitored Soviet institutions) and about it Colleagues responded positively.

The result of the purges was the complete subordination of the secret police, including the Gestapo, to G. Himmler. Political police departments became part of the general secret police. The main 2nd department of the Gestapo, whose tasks included the fight against internal enemies, was headed by R. Heydrich, as well as the security service of the Nazi party. Leman was in the 3rd department, which dealt with counterintelligence.

At the end of 1933, Zarubin, using American documents, arrived in Germany and from the next year established constant contact with a deeply embedded agent who passed on valuable intelligence data: detailed information about the structure, personnel and operations of the German intelligence services, the scale of military construction, foreign policy plans and intentions Germany.

In the counterintelligence department of the Gestapo, which dealt with issues of appropriate support for the defense industry, Lehmann had the opportunity to learn about the tests of missiles created by V. von Braun. Based on them, the V-1 and V-2 rockets will subsequently be manufactured. The Center, based on this important information, compiled a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the state of German rocketry.

In addition, Willy reported on Nazi plans to create submarines, improved security vehicles, improved gas masks and synthetic fuels. Of course, Zarubin received information through other channels, but Breitenbach, without a doubt, was the most important link in the illegal station. For a full 1-2 years, he actively collaborated with Soviet intelligence and, under the daily threat of exposure, reported to Moscow extremely important information about the development and strengthening of the Nazi regime, about global preparations for the establishment of a new world domination, about the obvious increase in military potential and the intensification of scientific work on the development modern technology.

On top of that, Lehmann, without exaggeration, can be called the guardian angel of Soviet intelligence officers - he notified the Soviet station about Gestapo operations, alleged arrests and provocations. As a result, for quite a long time she forgot about the failures. Zarubin learned about changes in the operational situation in the state, political events, and intrigues behind the scenes of Nazi power.

Zarubin paid the closest attention to the strictest safety rules. On his initiative, documents were prepared for Willie so that, if necessary, he could leave the country. Conditional signals were defined in case of an unexpected Gestapo raid or arrest.

Moscow constantly reminded of the need for maximum caution, not only because of the worsening situation in Germany, where Hitler had captured the Rhineland, but also because of Lehmann's poor health. Suffering from acute renal colic, he sometimes lost consciousness from attacks. When the Center found out about this, they became seriously concerned and offered an impressive sum of money for treatment. Just to begin with, it was necessary to make sure that there were no questions about the unexpected appearance of all this money. As a result, Willie publicly announced at the horse races that he had won a large sum, and was glad that he could see an expensive doctor. Thus, the patient recovered, and his relationship with Soviet intelligence became even more trusting. However, this was only the beginning of the trials that befell the scout.

In 1936, the Gestapo became interested in Lehmann’s contacts in the Soviet trade mission. Willie replied that he was only engaged in authorized representation and had nothing to do with trading. In the end it was established that the Gestapo suspected his namesake, who had been slandered by a jealous mistress. The “Soviet” Lehman was “rehabilitated.”

In the summer of that year, he was assigned to take care of counterintelligence support for additional areas of the military industry. Breitenbach received and transmitted to the Center important information about the state of the military industry of the Nazi state, in particular about the start of construction at the shipyards of over 70 submarines, as well as a highly classified plant for the production of chemical weapons. Lehmann handed over many copies of secret documents, for example a list of 14 new weapons developments or a report “On the organization of the national defense of Germany.” The Soviet leadership could only objectively evaluate the intelligence data presented (unfortunately, this was not done fully).

In the corridors and offices of the Gestapo, he met many “characters” of the epic about Stirlitz, which, undoubtedly, also brings these heroes closer together. Lehmann communicated with leading Nazi figures and compiled detailed profiles for Soviet intelligence on G. Müller, W. Schellenberg, G. Himmler, R. Heydrich and other leaders of the German intelligence services. Willy enjoyed trust, as evidenced, for example, by the fact that on the eve of the New Year's holiday in 1936, as one of the best employees, he was presented with a portrait of the Fuhrer in a silver frame.

In 1937, Zarubin’s valuable cooperation with Lehman came to an end - the Soviet Union began to plunge into the abyss of repression against representatives of the security forces. By order of People's Commissar N.I. Yezhov, the resident was returned to Moscow. Zarubin gave appropriate instructions to Willy about independently maintaining contact with Moscow. At home, Zarubin escaped reprisals and subsequently continued to work in the United States and the central office in Moscow, rising to the rank of general. However, he was not destined to return to the German capital.

Purges in the ranks of Soviet intelligence had a negative impact on its activities, and in the late 1930s. she practically stopped. This could not but affect the quality of the relationship with Lehman. At that time, the legal residency in Berlin was represented only by A. Agayants, who was already having difficulty coping with the responsibilities that fell upon him. Despite this, he still met with Breitenbach. The latter, by chance, set off on a free voyage and at great risk, obtained information interesting for Soviet intelligence. So, he reported to Moscow: “I have no reason to worry. I am sure that friends know that everything here is done in good faith, everything that can be done. For now, there is no particular urgency in coming to me. If necessary, I will let you know."

However, the charge of positive thinking did not last long. The Nazis planned to capture Austria, after which it was the turn of the Munich Agreement to dismember Czechoslovakia. Lehman was well aware of this and understood that such information should be extremely important for the USSR. However, he essentially had no way left to contact Soviet intelligence. At that time, he was prompted to cooperate mainly by ideological considerations. Monetary reward was not particularly important to him, since his wife Margaret owned a hotel, which provided them with a comfortable existence. The main reason for his subversive activities in the Nazi state was the awareness (this was greatly facilitated by access to the highest secrets of the Third Reich) of where ideas about the superiority of a certain race and the outbreak of a world war could lead the German people.

At the end of 1938, Agayants died during a surgical operation, and his last meeting with Leman took place in November of the same year. Now Breitenbach has lost all contact with Moscow. Greatly alarmed, in June 1940 he wrote a letter to Moscow, in which he called for the restoration of operational communication with him. At the same time, Willy noted: “If this does not happen, then my work in the Gestapo will lose all meaning.” However, the reaction followed only in September - A. Korotkov met with the source.

On September 9, 1940, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria gave the instruction: “No special assignments should be given to Breitenbach. It is necessary to take for now everything that is within his immediate capabilities, and, in addition, everything that he will know about the work of various intelligence services against the USSR, in the form of documents and personal reports from the source.” B. Zhuravlev, a recent graduate of the intelligence school, was appointed as the new resident for communication with Leman. Willie handed him the available materials, the resident photographed them and returned them before morning. Breitenbach resumed supplying a huge amount of valuable intelligence supporting Germany's preparations for war with the "Eastern Bear". For example, in March 1941, it was clear from a report that German intelligence was hastily expanding the unit responsible for carrying out intelligence activities against the USSR.

On June 19, at an urgent meeting between Lehmann and Zhuravlev, words were spoken about the Fuhrer’s secret order received by the secret police to German military units located along the Soviet border, indicating the specific date and time of the attack: June 22, after 3 o’clock. That morning, the Soviet embassy was surrounded by the Gestapo, no one without letting in or letting out. Breitenbach did not contact Soviet intelligence again.

When the Great Patriotic War was already drawing to a close, A. Korotkov became the resident of the NKVD in Germany. He was instructed to find out about the fate of pre-war sources of information and, if possible, restore contacts. One of the resident’s colleagues found in the ruins of the Gestapo building a document on Willy Lehmann with a note about his arrest in December 1942. Later, a more or less complete picture was created about the fate of one of the most valuable informants of Soviet intelligence.

In May 1942, A. Hessler (Franz) and R. Barth (Beck) were sent to Berlin to restore contact with anti-fascists. After the latter was in the hands of the Gestapo, he told everything he knew. The infiltrator in the heart of the secret police was reported to G. Müller. At the end of 1942, Willie was urgently called to work, which he never left, having been secretly killed. Of course, there could be no talk of any publicity, because it would be extremely unpleasant to admit that a Soviet agent had long since penetrated the Gestapo.

They did not even dare to report this to Hitler. As an official explanation, the Gestapo official newsletter published the following notice: “Criminal inspector Willy Lehmann gave his life for the Fuhrer and the Reich in December 1942.”

Willy Lehman stands out from all the other Soviet agents. While many of them supplied information only on some specific areas and industries, Breitenbach, thanks to his position in the Gestapo, transmitted general and detailed information about everything. Only he indicated the specific date of the start of the war with the Soviet Union.

The post-war leadership of the GDR asked the Soviet Union not to award awards to Willy Lehmann, since, despite his merits, he was still a Gestapo man. In Germany even now the attitude towards him is ambiguous. Some time ago, the German magazine Der Spiegel reported that 2 publishing houses were planning to translate and publish books about Breitenbach. However, responses to the note were ambivalent: some recognized Willy as a hero (usually residents of the former GDR), while others considered him a traitor. Perhaps that is why the publishing houses abandoned their intentions.